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In my view, there is a real need for the kind of book that Robert Morgan’s 
Heinrich Schenker: Music Theory and Ideology aspires to be: a succinct, 
lucid, and sympathetic summary of the most important works of the most 
important music theorist, one that shows how those works comprise an 
integrated theoretical program, a “complete, self–enclosed system” (14)—
in a word, a Wissenschaft. Needless to say, this is in many circles no longer 
seen as a fashionable, or even remotely credible, way of doing intellec-
tual history. A backward glance at the last few decades of developments in 
music studies leaves one with the impression that the project of rational 
reconstruction died a mostly unmourned death when Dahlhaus died a 
premature death in 1989.1 But “Schenkerism,” as Narmour dubbed it, 
has always been a flagrantly, joyfully, and (in large part) self–consciously 
unfashionable “ism,” even (or especially) back when Schenker was figur-
ing out how to be a Schenkerian. And, in the case of a temporally and 
culturally remote, sometimes willfully opaque, unfailingly cantankerous 
thinker like Schenker, reconstruction—which blends the exegete’s task of 
making a text as comprehensible as possible with the advocate’s task of 
making it as convincing and relevant as possible—is arguably a necessary 
precondition for anything resembling deconstruction, however important 
and edifying that hermeneutic occupation may be.
Thus I side with Morgan on a fundamental level, in that I think his 
book aims at a target worth aiming at. Many in the field will disagree. So 
be it; I’m happy to submit the opinion as a minority report. On this point, 
however, I anticipate consensus: Morgan fails to hit his target’s bull’s–eye. 
While there is plenty to be learned from Becoming Heinrich Schenker, and 
while everyone who likes to think about Schenker should read it (faute 
de mieux), I have reservations about how successfully it prosecutes the 
goals it sets for itself. In what follows, I will use the three components 
of the book’s title—“Becoming Heinrich Schenker,” “Music Theory,” and 
“Ideology”—to orient my criticisms and substantiate this verdict.
“Becoming Heinrich Schenker”
Curiously, Becoming Heinrich Schenker has little to do with how Heinrich 
Schenker became Heinrich Schenker. Aside from a thumbnail sketch in the 
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first chapter, the book contains little biographical material. A more appro-
priate title for Becoming Heinrich Schenker would have been Becoming Free 
Composition, the better to reflect two facts: 1) that the text is essentially a 
chronological book report on Schenker’s best–known writings (“The Spirit 
of Musical Technique,” Harmony, Counterpoint vols. 1 and 2, Schenker’s 
monographs and explanatory editions, The Will of the Tones, The Masterwork 
in Music, and Free Composition); and 2) that the overarching thesis of this 
Literaturübersicht is a teleological one, to the effect that everything prior to 
Free Composition “can be beneficially viewed as evolving toward the final 
theory” (xiv), since “Schenker’s evolution can be understood as basically 
consistent and unidirectional” as it “moves toward the final theory” (xviii).2 
In a refinement of this thesis, we are told that Schenker’s early ideas and 
his final theory are non–equivalent but genealogically connected: “I do not 
myself feel that a direct line can be drawn between all the ideas expressed in 
Schenker’s early works and those in the later ones, nor that they are in any 
way equivalent. But I do feel that some concepts expressed in the early works 
anticipate later ones in a way that seems both powerful and inevitable. It is 
not, then, that the earlier works completely predict the subsequent ones, but 
that some ideas introduced there can be viewed as both related to later ones 
and providing them a sort of prior foundation” (xviii). The book’s objectives, 
accordingly, are to 1) provide some historical background and a resume of 
“Schenker’s final theory” (Chapters 1–2); 2) selectively interpret passages 
of Schenker’s pre–Free Composition publications by viewing them through 
the lens of the final theory (Chapters 3–7); and 3) evaluate the merits of 
Schenker’s final theory (Chapters 8–10).
Let me reiterate that I have no grievance to bring against Morgan’s self–
avowedly teleological approach per se. In the face of the prevailing post–
structuralist historiographical orthodoxy, which legislates that progressiv-
ist historical narratives are uncreditable, and that even conceptualization 
itself is to be held in some degree of suspicion,3 I have grown nostalgic for 
a bygone Hegelian age, one in which we were given to believe that the past 
has intelligibility for us only as a repository of potentialities that find their 
complete realization in the present, potentialities that progressively actual-
ize themselves in a way that is, in the broadest possible sense, rational (a 
process Hegel discusses under the heading of “the march of reason through 
history”). Thus there is something bold and refreshing, for unrepentant 
Hegelians at least, in Morgan’s candor about his desire to tell a Whiggish, 
retrospective tale about the cumulative revelation of an “entire mature sys-
tem” (103 and 224) across Schenker’s oeuvre.
Unfortunately, there is at times something stale in the telling. Many of 
Morgan’s ceremoniously unveiled interpretive theses strike the reader as 
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either self–evident or tritely familiar. We are told that Harmony’s theoriza-
tion of Stufen and Counterpoint’s theorization of the strict/free composi-
tion dichotomy are, later on in Free Composition, united in a “concrete 
method that would show how the idealized content of Stufen in free com-
position could be derived from the actual content of musical progressions, 
and a concrete method that would show how the idealized content of 
species counterpoint could also be derived from those same progressions” 
(97); that Schenker’s earlier essays and books contain analyses that exhibit 
inchoate anticipations of methods that Schenker brings to bear in his later 
analyses; that Geist deals with some themes that remain preoccupations of 
Schenker’s for the rest of his life but also expresses some views Schenker 
later came to repudiate. And, compounding platitude with redundancy, 
Becoming Heinrich Schenker displays throughout an almost incantatory 
repetition of these and other stereotypical chestnuts. I lost track of the 
number of times it was reaffirmed that Schenker’s focus was on a smallish 
group of mostly German masterpieces, that Schenker was fixated on the 
topic of genius, that his analytical technique is distinguished by its syn-
optic and totalizing pretensions, and so on.4 None of this is wrong, but 
none of it is newsworthy. That being said, an instructor might find it use-
ful to assign Morgan’s thematic summaries to students in order to provide 
them with an interpretive skeleton to be fleshed out later by treatments of 
Schenker’s conceptual development (e.g. in the work of Pastille, Blasius, 
Korsyn, Snarrenberg, Karnes, and others) that are rather more nuanced 
and penetrating, but ipso facto less comprehensive than what Morgan 
provides.
However, those who have little familiarity with Schenker will find 
Morgan’s overview of Schenker’s Musikanschauung (Chapter 2) to be for-
biddingly abstract, for Morgan does not situate Schenker’s interpretive cat-
egories within the matrix of musical details that gave birth to those catego-
ries. Nobody who doesn’t already know what reaching over is will be able to 
make heads or tails of the sole thing Morgan says about it, which is that it 
“combines an incomplete descending neighbor motion and superimposed 
inner voices in a regular pattern that often results in a rising linear pro-
gression” (22). Giving a rundown of Schenker’s analytical concepts without 
referring them back copiously to the passages of real music they are meant 
to explicate leads necessarily to a certain kind of fetishism, in that it tends 
to reify those concepts and treat them as though they held some intrinsic 
interest all on their own. What interests us, though, isn’t the Platonic form 
of Übergreifung, glimpsed in the purifying light of total abstraction, but 
instead the real music that yields up something of the secret of its beauty 
when brought under this concept.
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Yet I don’t think Morgan can be faulted too severely on this score. In 
the first place, the person guiltiest of fetishizing Schenkerian analytical 
concepts is Heinrich Schenker; Morgan is a minor offender by comparison. 
In the second place, the error is forgivable in proportion to its unavoid-
ability. Inasmuch as Schenker studies has established itself as an academic 
discipline, it has placed itself under an obligation to produce the trappings 
thereof, such as book chapters that encapsulate Schenker’s musical horizon 
of reference. But the nature of the material prevents this obligation from 
being satisfactorily fulfilled. The Schenkerian conception of music cannot 
be distilled down to a list of discrete propositions. Instead, Schenkerian 
analysis is an activity that flows from an irreducibly intricate musical form 
of life (to borrow an expression from one of Morgan’s favorite philosophers, 
Wittgenstein, to whom we will return), one which must be lived out if its 
indigenous concepts are to be grasped. And this isn’t just a problem for 
Becoming Heinrich Schenker; it is a problem for Free Composition. How 
does one summarize what is refractory to verbal summarization? How does 
one substitute saying for doing without remainder? It is no coincidence that 
the most expedient means of transmitting and inculcating Schenkerian 
modes of knowing, the kind of proficiency the analyst bodies forth when 
she gives a Schenkerian reading of a piece, is not, and never has been, the 
textbook summary, nor indeed the written word in any of its manifesta-
tions. “Schenkerizing,” like piano playing, must be learned at the knee of an 
expert whose actions can be emulated—a fact which dooms from the start 
the genre of the Schenkerian conspectus.
This does not entirely exculpate Morgan. I imagine that novitiates will 
not find his digest of Free Composition to be appreciably easier to digest 
than Free Composition itself. And I would think that any reader with enough 
expertise to comprehendingly follow Morgan’s summary of Schenker’s ana-
lytical technique probably has too much expertise to feel very engaged by it, 
as it contains nothing groundbreaking or novel. However, I could be wrong. 
Maybe I am underestimating the appeal of hearing a familiar story told 
with different words. Semper idem, sed non eodem modo, as Schenker says.5
“Theory”
One problem with Becoming Heinrich Schenker’s teleological argument 
is that its conception of the pertinent telos—its stance on what counts as 
part of a putative final theory—is overly inclusive. In Chapter 2 we get an 
itemized list of “the theory’s basic assumptions” (19). Most of these are 
the canonical Schenkerian interpretive categories: composing out, trans-
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formation, the Ursatz and Urlinie, foreground/middleground/background, 
interruption, compound melody, substitution, and so on. But another 
entry on the list is the “assumption that tones have egos whose spiritual 
tendencies must be obeyed” (30), also described as “the idealistic belief 
that tones have ‘wills’ or ‘egos’: a spiritual dimension that requires them 
to behave in a certain way and no other” (17). One of these assumptions 
is not like the others. That is problematic: running together Schenker’s 
formalist categories with his penchant for anthropomorphizing sound is a 
bit like running together Newton’s laws of motion with Newton’s claim that 
space is the sensorium Dei (“God’s sense organ”), in that it tends to erode 
the distinction between modes of discourse whose differences should be 
acknowledged. Is the “assumption” that music can and should be parsed 
according to certain structuralist/organicist paradigms analogous to the 
“assumption” that “tones have a biological nature which gives them their 
own egos”? Couldn’t Schenker’s talk of wills and egos be impressionistic 
and metaphorical in a way that his talk of a five–line isn’t (even if the latter 
way of talking still bears an irremovable residue of metaphor)?
These questions are only partly rhetorical, for it seems to me that the 
very purport (not to mention the truth–value) of the claim that tones have 
a “biological nature” is far from obvious. Simply saying that Schenker 
believed such a thing is roughly as informative as saying that Hegel be-
lieved that the true is the whole (das Wahre ist das Ganze) and leaving 
it at that. Most of us will have little notion of how to believe this, much 
less whether to believe it. In other words, in the absence of serious and 
sustained philological work, much of what Schenker wrote confronts us as 
a cipher. But instead of philology, what we often get in Becoming Heinrich 
Schenker is the uncritical adoption of idiomatic Schenkerian forms of ex-
pression6 in passages that are supposed to clarify what Schenker believed. 
In his own voice and without irony, Morgan offhandedly refers to music’s 
“spiritual nature,” the “spiritual meaning of strict counterpoint,” music’s 
“harmony–based spirituality,” “spiritually anchored tones,” the “spiritual 
unity of a second–species third progression,” “spiritual verticalities,” and 
the “spirituality of counterpoint in general.” My soul! As a rule, one should 
try to avoid talking like Schenker when talking about Schenker—it makes 
the reader search for missing quotation marks.
There is a basic question lurking in the background of all this: what 
kind of a theory is Schenker’s theory? Is it a predictive empirical stylistics? 
A theory of auditory ethics? A Kantian theory of unity? These questions 
have set a river of ink flowing. To my surprise, Becoming Heinrich Schenker 
hardly dips its toes in the current. The absence of engagement with the sec-
ondary meta–theoretical literature on the epistemological underpinnings 
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of Schenker’s system goes hand in hand with the author’s assumption that 
Schenker’s “final theory” is something like the sum total of all the pro-
nouncements that Schenker issued about music after some sufficiently ad-
vanced date (say, the publication of The Masterwork in Music): if you aren’t 
worried about what kind of theory Schenker’s theory is, you don’t need to 
worry about which of his statements are properly theoretical statements. 
But both of these seem like worries worth having. Certainly they are in the 
case of Newton, where we would like to acknowledge an important dif-
ference between “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction” 
and “space is the sensorium Dei” by saying that the former statement does, 
and the latter statement does not, belong to Newtonian physics properly 
so–called.
The danger of being insufficiently concerned with these meta–theo-
retical issues comes to the fore when we read that Schenker’s graph of 
Bach’s Prelude No. 1 in C major “contains not only theoretical information 
about the pitches but non–theoretical information about the rhythmic and 
phrase relationships supporting them” (Schenker’s hypermetric indica-
tions aren’t underwritten by some sort of tacit theory?), or when we try to 
reconcile the claim that “Schenker believed—and consistently stressed—
that his final theory provided music with ultimate truth” (8) with the claim 
that one of “Schenker’s fundamental beliefs” was that “only a small canon 
of compositions with a great deal in common and susceptible to detailed 
analytical explanation can provide the complete musical truth demanded 
by his theory” (29). I don’t know what it means to say that the theory pro-
vides the music with truth, nor what means to say that the music provides 
the theory with truth, but I do know that it is circular to say both, and I 
doubt that Schenker is the one thinking in circles here.
“Ideology”
For many, “ideology” rings either Marxist or post–Marxist bells. Either 
the word picks out a form of mystification, conducive to the economic 
interests of the ruling classes, that it is possible to transcend or unmask as 
false (as in the classical Marxist model); or the gist of it is that our forms of 
consciousness are conditioned by the dominant economic formation and 
resultant superstructural phenomena fully and absolutely, making ideol-
ogy an inexpugnable force that shapes our very appreciation of the distinc-
tion between what is real and what is unreal, essential and inessential, a 
force whose influence cannot be escaped so long as we remain within the 
confines of what Nietzsche calls “the prison house of language” (as in a 
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Lacanian or Althusserian model of ideology). Becoming Heinrich Schenker 
begins with an attempt to unring those bells:
Since ideology, as a conceptual framework through which experience is 
filtered as part of a more orderly overall picture, is often viewed with 
suspicion, some explanation of its stress here seems appropriate. Distrust 
of ideology stems mainly from the negative meaning it acquired through 
association with Marxism, within which it has consistently been un-
derstood as a source of ‘false consciousness’ that distorted normal con-
ceptions of material reality by turning them upside down, rather like a 
camera obscura. Yet ideologies can also be consensual and pervasive, and 
they can exist in forms that reflect general social and intellectual posi-
tions rather than specifically political ones. In addition, they are held with 
various degrees of emphasis, professed or unacknowledged, conscious or 
unconscious, rigid or flexible. In this more general sense, ideology exists 
behind all forms of thought, including Schenker’s. (4)7
Morgan is frank about wishing to extinguish the political charge of the 
term “ideology.” And perhaps The Magic Mountain’s Settembrini is wrong 
to insist that “The apolitical does not exist—everything is politics.” Still, 
the political overtones of “ideology” are hard not to hear, especially when 
the ideologist in question is an arch–reactionary nationalist, and one feels 
therefore that the word is wildly overused in Morgan’s book, whose title be-
lies the fact that it is mostly an exposition of a set of beliefs Schenker pub-
licly attested to holding. Explicating and tracing the literary provenance of 
Schenker’s overt aesthetic platform is very different from diagnosing the 
etiology of the all–embracing, materially– and socially–determined, class–
based normative take on things of which that platform is symptomatic. 
To be sure, Morgan can use “ideology” however he sees fit to use it.8 But I 
can’t help but think that it is misleading for the cover of Becoming Heinrich 
Schenker to cash in on the academic vogue enjoyed by the word “ideology” 
while the pages of the book remain at a cautious distance from anything 
most critics of ideology would wish to call “ideology critique.”
What is inscribed upon the doxastic edifice equivocally labelled 
“Schenker’s ideology?” First and foremost we find an incompatible blend 
of the new and the old, or of the old and the older: “there are some distinct 
peculiarities to the theory, one of the most telling being that it contains an 
ideological paradox consisting of two apparently independent and opposed 
philosophical strains: a nineteenth–century Idealist one and a twentieth–
century Modernist one. Although both influenced the theory’s formation 
in a critical way, the Idealist one should be considered the dominant one, 
for it supplied the theory with its basic core—the spirituality of tone” (xiv). 
However, having been assured of the central importance of an “ideologi-
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cal paradox” and of the “conflicted nature of Schenker’s theory” (xiv), we 
then encounter, bafflingly, the assessments that Schenker’s theory grows 
up around an “internally consistent ideological framework” (4), that it can 
be understood as “basically consistent” (xviii), and that (according to the 
book’s conclusion) “much of Schenker’s [idealist] theoretical development 
was consistent with his scientific orientation.”
Which is it? Is Schenker’s theory riddled with paradox, or has 
Schenker succeeded in constructing a “complete, self–enclosed system” 
that hangs together consistently and coherently? Contrary to what one 
might expect, no answer to this question is ventured in Chapter 9, en-
titled “Critical assessment: Ideology,” which is meant to “[take] into ac-
count both the advantages and the disadvantages of the theory.” Instead 
the chapter leaves to one side theory–internal questions about consis-
tency and coherence and turns its attention to allegedly powerful external 
objections to Schenker’s theory. One of these is a Wittgensteinian refuta-
tion of Schenker’s whole agenda. “A . . . Wittgensteinian point is that any 
human activity, such as music, must take place within a ‘public’ arena 
where it participates in what Wittgenstein calls a communally sanctioned 
‘language game,’ which is itself embedded in shared ‘forms of life’ . . . It 
may be that Schenker’s manner of theorizing, even measured against the 
standards of music theory, is obsessively cult–like and that, by relying 
upon what Wittgenstein calls a ‘private language,’ it takes part in what for 
him is a logical impossibility. Human communication always requires the 
presence of public conventions” (185).
Wittgenstein’s private language argument is a tough nut to crack, and 
there is no consensus among Wittgenstein’s commentators about how 
the argument is supposed to go or about whether it succeeds. Minimally, 
though, all parties to the debate agree that the private language argument is 
intended to demonstrate that the very concept of a language spoken by one 
person (a language comprehensible in principle to one and only one per-
son) is incoherent or unintelligible or self–abnegating—like the concept of 
a square circle or of an equitable capitalist society. I won’t offer my own or 
anyone else’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s tortuous argument here; I’ll 
merely mention a few points that are wholly obvious and uncontroversial. 
The private language argument has nothing at all to do with criticizing 
the use of jargon or esoteric speech, nor does it have anything to do with 
dialects or idiolects (the characteristic ways in which groups or individuals 
speak a public language), nor does it have anything to do with the mutual 
intelligibility of linguistic subcultures. It is nonsensical to raise the worry 
that Schenker is guilty of “relying on what Wittgenstein calls a ‘private lan-
guage,’” given that Wittgenstein’s whole point is that there can’t be any such 
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thing and that we can’t coherently conceive of such a thing. It is equally 
nonsensical to wonder whether Schenker’s theory “takes part in what for 
[Wittgenstein] is a logical impossibility.” It is not likely that Wittgenstein 
thinks that the impossibility of a private language is distinctively logical 
(i.e. formally contradictory, in violation of the law of non–contradiction), 
but, in any event, logically impossible states of affairs cannot obtain (at any 
possible world!) so nothing can “take part” in them. Private languages aren’t 
naughty things; they aren’t things. This total mishandling of Wittgenstein 
unintentionally corroborates Morgan’s earlier claim that “attempts to 
clarify [Schenker’s ideas] often result in further distortion” (160).
Just as there is confusion in Becoming Heinrich Schenker about the 
consistency of Schenker’s “theory” and its “ideological framework,” there 
is confusion about the nature of the twin components of this ideological 
economy, Schenker’s so–called “idealism” (a.k.a. Schenker’s “speculative” 
side) and its counterpart, which Morgan variously designates as “modern-
ism,” “materialism,” “empiricism,” and “scientific orientation.” Time and 
again we are reminded that Schenker is an idealist who believes in the “ideal 
nature” and “spirituality” of tones, a belief that allegedly is in tension with 
Schenker’s investigatory/explanatory/scientific impulses. But, to re–pose a 
question from above, what is Schenker committing himself to when he 
calls music geistig? And how is this commitment manifested in, or traceable 
to, the system propounded by any particular idealist philosopher? If one 
wishes to document Schenker’s allegiance to (some form of) idealism, it is 
not enough to superficially note that there is something rather “subjective,” 
and thus empirically suspect, and thus “idealist” or “speculative,” about 
particular Schenkerian turns of phrase. Yet that is the altitude at which 
Becoming Heinrich Schenker mostly hovers: “Although Schenker may have 
couched his subjective elements—such as the will of tones, mental reten-
tion, prolongation, and long–range hearing—in terms that suggested that 
they were somehow scientifically sanctioned (as he himself seems to have 
believed), they cannot be empirically justified, as they are linked to the 
ephemerality of human hearing. The theory, characterized by a mixture of 
speculative (personal) and empirical (impersonal) elements, is thus seen 
by Schenker himself as the work ‘of an artist’” (12).
The reason that topics such as human hearing and the mental retention 
of tones are supposed to lie outside the purview of empirical investigation 
is just as unclear to me as is the reason for positing a close kinship between 
the subjective or personal and an imagined philosophical monolith called 
“idealism” or “speculative philosophy.” It is important to bear in mind that 
the idealists were a diverse bunch who spent most of their time arguing 
with one another rather than with non–idealists and that there is no single 
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creed called “German idealism.” Fichte perhaps gave some latitude to sub-
jectivity and personality (a much greater concern of the romantics than of 
the idealists) when he claimed that “[W]hat sort of philosophy one chooses 
depends on what sort of man one is; for a philosophical system is not a dead 
piece of furniture that we can accept or reject as we wish; it is animated by 
the soul of the person who holds it” (1982, 16). But Hegel, famously, purges 
such individualism from his account of the attainment of “absolute knowl-
edge,” humankind’s objective (yet self–directed) knowledge of its own so-
cially–enacted spiritual and philosophical Bildung (cultural maturation). 
Hegel also would not have regarded himself as being at all implicated in 
the glib insistence that it must be “understood that Schenker, following 
the Idealists, believed that truly imaginative, constructive knowledge exists 
only when it is unaware of itself ” (202). Schelling rhapsodizes about the 
unconscious now and then (although he never characterizes it as the only 
source of knowledge) but, in purposeful opposition to Schelling, Hegel 
maintains that the only conversation worth having about knowledge is a 
conversation about how the world is ineluctably coming to know itself (in-
deed, to know itself knowing itself) by means of the relentless attainment of 
self–consciousness and self–reflexivity by what he calls “Geist” (the norma-
tive human world of value structures, institutions, culture, and language). 
For Hegel, knowledge just is collective self–awareness, the emergence from 
unselfconsciousness.
This demonstrates that it is perilous to talk about the German idealists 
as though there were some philosophical catechism to which they were all 
pledged. Idealism, like Schenkerism, is more of a philosophical posture or 
Denkungsart, a way of addressing oneself to the materials of thought, than a 
creed that can be decomposed into a set of discreet teachings or orthodox-
ies. It is also perilous, though in a different way, to use “idealist” as a kind 
of catch–all pejorative for any commitment of whose empirical credentials 
one is suspicious: “In fact, the idealist origins of some of the theory’s most 
fundamental assumptions—its basis in nature, appeal to genius, national-
istic bias, etc.—indicates that these have no objective empirical grounding. 
Their features, as well as others such as musical logic and necessity, provide 
from an empirical perspective at best an efficient means for grounding the 
work theoretically” (205). Often, in Becoming Heinrich Schenker, “idealism” 
simply stands for whatever is opposed to “the empirical assumption that 
musical understanding is derived from close musical observation” (xiv), as 
in Morgan’s claim that “despite the emphasis that has been correctly placed 
on his idealist roots, [Schenker] was also strongly influenced by scientific 
attitudes, especially in his later stress on musical hierarchy, theoretical no-
tation, and the empirical observation of actual music” (43). This use of 
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“idealist” will perplex anyone who has studied the German idealists’ writ-
ings on nature. For one thing you can say about all these philosophers is 
that, whatever internecine disagreement may have divided them, they were 
united by zest for establishing the notional foundations of the natural sci-
ences (even if they sometimes levelled peculiar criticisms against practicing 
scientists, as Hegel and Goethe did against Newton). Of great concern for 
Kant and his philosophical heirs was the need to demonstrate that both we 
and nature are constituted in such a way that empirical observation can be 
a source of genuine knowledge for us. There is no sense in which Schenker’s 
idealism (whatever congeries of positions and affiliations “Schenker’s ideal-
ism” might turn out to signify), insofar as it is bequethed to him by the 
luminaries of classical German philosophy, is even prima facie opposed to 
his penchant for the “close musical observation.” It seems to me, therefore, 
that the fundamental dichotomy upon which Becoming Heinrich Schenker’s 
axial interpretive claim hinges is a false one.
A nice feature of Becoming Heinrich Schenker is the amount of primary 
source material it contains. Roughly an eighth of the book is made up of 
block quotations, some of them previously untranslated, many of them im-
provements upon the existing translations. Additionally, all of the original 
German (about 50 pages) is given in an appendix, a feature that should be 
standard in all publications about Schenker. Morgan’s own translations are 
by and large both readable and impeccably accurate, and he plainly has 
an enviable command of the German language as well as compendious 
knowledge of Schenker’s published writings.9 This makes one wish that 
Becoming Heinrich Schenker were in its entirety what it occasionally verges 
on being: a topically organized Schenkerian “reader” that allows Schenker 
to “speak of his own work in his own voice” (xx). It would be useful to 
have a single volume that collates, translates, and annotates Schenker’s 
wide–ranging commentary on German nationalism, organicism, freedom, 
God, and other topics dear to his heart, since this commentary is dispersed 
across many publications and is often a byplay to a music–analytical argu-
ment that takes center stage.
Schenker scholars have a big job ahead of them figuring out how 
Schenker became the thinker he became, probing the question of what 
kind of a theory Schenker’s theory is, and delivering an analysis and 
critique of Schenker’s ideology. Robert Morgan is to be commended for 
making some headway on this front even if, as I have tried to indicate, his 
book exhibits less philosophical acumen than his topic demands. I hope 
that all those who are fascinated by the philosophical/ideological side 
of Schenker will read Becoming Heinrich Schenker and feel motivated to 




1. In music theory, and Schenker studies in particular, one finds countercurrents to this 
trend, notably in the work of Matthew Brown and Mark DeBellis.
2. Everything, that is, with the exception of everything that Schenker wrote prior to “The 
Spirit of Musical Technique,” which allegedly “contain[s] little . . . that relates directly to the 
later work” (41) and is thus in no way “vital to Schenker’s overall development” (xx). This is 
a flatly unbelievable claim for which no substantiation is offered.
3. See Taruskin 2010, 380–82.
4. “This emphasis on masterpieces and genius indicates that Schenker does not have all mu-
sic in mind, but only a limited canon of what are in his view great works” (101); “Schenker’s 
theory thus views the composition’s overall tonal structure as an unfolding of the tonic tri-
ad, its first level [like all others] covering the entire piece, and consisting of the unfolding’s 
simplest form: a stepwise descent in the top voice [the most proximate type of melodic mo-
tion] down to the tonic, accompanied by a three–part triadic arpeggiation in the bass [the 
most fundamental type of harmonic motion]” (227); “One of the theory’s most important 
features thus became its hierarchical structure, which allowed this theoretical framework to 
be presented as a set of interrelated layers, each included in the following one” (227).
5. My own pleasure in hearing Becoming Heinrich Schenker’s version of the story of Schen-
ker’s conceptual odyssey was diminished by numerous banalities and infelicities of style: 
“This last point provides Schenker with a wedge showing that minor—even if vicariously—
also partakes of nature, though the rescue is conflicted” (65). “The theory, then, serves a 
useful purpose; but like all things in life, it is imperfect. Its ideological foundations cannot 
be dismissed, whether they are related to Schenker’s historical evolution or to the theoreti-
cal result. But our own conception of the theory is the only one available to us, and this 
depends finally on how we feel about it” (228). “Indeed, Schenker was surprisingly encom-
passing, rigid, and open in stating the ideology behind his work, to whose underlying as-
sumptions he was unequivocally inclined” (4). “Schenker will thus always remain a puzzle, 
even if he is by no means uniquely so” (228). What is a puzzle, even if it is by no means 
uniquely so, is how some of these sentences got past an editor at Cambridge University 
Press.
6. Morgan notes that, as Schenker uses it, “Geist” and its derivatives “are associated with 
mental states that go beyond purely material matters by referring to musical situations 
that transcend the unprocessed musical stimulus itself ” (96), a statement which is both 
too vague to be informative and too deflationary to do justice to the richness of Schenker’s 
conception of Geist.
7. Curiously, a book that begins by repudiating Marx ends by warmly embracing him: “Since 
we have argued that Schenker’s position in Western music derives at least partly from his 
ideology, and that ideology is inseparably tied to theory, it seems appropriate to close this 
book with a quotation by one of the foundation thinkers of nineteenth–century social and 
economic history, Karl Marx. With reference to his contemporary, the philosopher Ludwig 
Feuerbach, and his mistaken views on eternal verities, Marx wrote:
He does not see how the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct 
from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of 
the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the 
result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the 
shoulders of the preceding one . . . [T]he cherry tree, like almost all fruit–trees, 
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was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by commerce into 
our zone, and therefore only by this action of a definite society in a definite age it 
has become ‘sensuous certainty.’”
As far as I can tell, this quote does not epitomize anything about Morgan’s reading of Schen-
ker. Indeed, Morgan’s hermetic “history of ideas” approach to discussing Schenker’s “self–
enclosed system” is fundamentally inimical to Marxist analysis in general and to the sensi-
bility Marx conveys in the quoted passage in particular.
8. See, for example, the seventeen “interconnected theses” whereby Morgan provides a “con-
ceptual ‘snapshot’” of Schenker’s “ideology” (171–72). The first three hold that “(1) great 
music is based on purely musical principles; (2) these are derived from nature; (3) from 
them music acquires organic coherences.” Such beliefs are of course indicative of an ideol-
ogy. But the (admittedly important) activity of enumerating Schenker’s professed beliefs, 
explicating them, and identifying their textual provenance, is not an activity best described 
as ideological analysis. At the least, we would like an ideological thesis to tell us something 
about how a given power structure (economic, political, or otherwise) engenders, and gets 
reproduced by, a form of subjectivity.
9. Morgan denies being a “dyed–in–the–wool” Schenkerian or one of Schenker’s “true dis-
ciples” on the grounds that he “does not think [that Schenker’s] analytical approach is the 
only valid one, or that the compositions in his canon are the only ones worthy of theo-
retical attention” (xix). But if those are the criteria for counting as a “dyed–in–the–wool” 
Schenkerian, I doubt there are any left, if there ever were any besides Schenker himself. 
(As Nietzsche quipped, the last Christian died on the cross.) Although Morgan promises 
that his account of Schenker’s theory will not be “an account from within” (xix), he later 
acknowledges that “in Part II of this book a primarily Schenkerian perspective was taken in 
treating the theory’s development, as it seemed appropriate to examine it from a basically 
neutral position” (183). I fail to understand how a Schenkerian perspective on Schenker 
could count as neutral, or could fail to count as “an account from within.”
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